



Agenda Item 5: Aviation Security Activities and Developments

REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL AVSEC DEVELOPMENTS AND ACTIVITIES

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper provides the Meeting with a discussion of a Regional Mechanism for sharing security information on threats to civil aviation.

References:

- Reports of the GREPECAS AVSEC COMM/3 and 4 Meetings.
- State Letter SP 48/1-06/19 dated 24 March 2006
- Doc 8973 - *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference*

1. Introduction

1.1. This paper presents to the Meeting ICAO's recent AVSEC global and regional activities and developments.

2. Annex 17 and the Security Manual

2.1 On 30 November 2005, the Council adopted Amendment 11 to Annex 17 prescribing 10 April 2006, as the date on which it would become effective and 1 July 2006 as the applicability date. Amendment 11 arises from the proposals of the sixteenth and seventeenth meetings of the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel held in May 2004 and March/April 2005, respectively. It has been developed in accordance with the Council's action in pursuance of Assembly Resolution A35-9, consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Annex 17 provisions were thoroughly reviewed in order to further clarify the wording of existing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) to facilitate both their common interpretation by Contracting States and their ease of auditing under the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP), as well as to ensure that the measures in Annex 17 are commensurate with the level of threat. Amendment 11 covers the following: applicability of Annex 17; reinforcement of national civil aviation security control programme provisions; In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs); general aviation and aerial work; one-stop security concept for passengers and baggage; risk assessment concept; security for all-cargo operations; and definitions. The letter, which was sent to States on 30 November 2005 is set forth in **Appendix A** to this paper.

2.2 The Security Manual of Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973) offers leadership and detailed guidance to States relating to the interpretation and implementation of the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17. The manual is restricted for distribution only to those individuals and organizations authorized by their State's appropriate authority. The manual is a highly useful tool for personnel engaged in national airline or airport AVSEC programmes, as well as for consultants or other private companies that specialize in the provision of AVSEC services and expertise. It provides detailed information and guidance to enable compliance with Annex 17 provisions relating to:

- AVSEC operations and personnel training;
- Detection devices and other AVSEC technologies;
- General equipment selection, procurement, maintenance and procedures; and
- The development of an effective State AVSEC legal framework.

2.3 The Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch (S&F) is also currently developing a guidance manual on "The Establishment and Management of a State's Security Oversight System", a manual which helps enable States in their effort to establish a robust aviation security oversight system and also prepare the road for the audit of each State's security oversight capability expected to commence in 2008. This manual is expected to be published during the third quarter of 2006.

3. Restructuring of the Security and Facilitation Branch

3.1 The Security and Facilitation Branch has been restructured into two branches, Specification and Guidance Material (SGM) and Coordinated Assistance and Development Section (CAD). The new CAD formerly the AVSEC Section is responsible for the management of:

- a) the Aviation Security Coordinated Assistance Programme ;
- b) future implications for aviation security; and
- c) management of the Aviation Security Training Programme

3.2 The programme was recently approved by the ICAO Council and is intended to permit Contracting States to:

- a) remedy their aviation security deficiencies revealed during the course of the ICAO aviation security audits conducted under the Universal Aviation Security Audit Programme;
- b) establish a sound aviation security infrastructure in accordance with ICAO Annex 17 and all relevant ICAO aviation security guidance material; and
- c) assist States to address emerging aviation security challenges.

3.3 The programme is being launched and implementation of its projects will commence in April 2006. It will be coordinated with other regional aviation bodies and UN agencies that are involved in combating acts of unlawful interference. The programme will also be coordinated with States that have expert and financial resources in aviation security and are willing to join ICAO in assisting States. Furthermore, CAD will continue to provide assistance under the Aviation Security Plan of Action.

4. Future Implications for aviation security

4.1 In today's world many factors have impact on the field of aviation security. These factors include legislation changes, regulatory policy, field operations, technology, aircraft and airport design and engineering as well as new and emerging threats. In an effort to stay ahead of its many challenges, ICAO is launching an initiative to deal with those developmental issues that impact aviation security. This initiative entails an outreach to Member States to introduce them to future challenges in aviation security, and also collaboration with industry partners such as airport and aircraft operators, aircraft and security equipment manufacturers. This approach will help States keep up with all new and emerging challenges to aviation security.

5. Recruitment of AVSEC Professionals

5.1 With the launch of a new ICAO strategy for aviation security assistance and development, and considering the continuously evolving and increasingly challenging nature of the aviation security field, the coordinated Assistance and Development Section (CAD) in the Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch, and Technical cooperation Bureau, are in the process of compiling a new roster of aviation security professionals. These professionals, if successfully recruited as short term experts will carry out ICAO aviation security missions to help ICAO contracting States; a) develop a sound aviation security infrastructure; b) correct aviation security deficiencies as revealed by the universal ICAO Aviation security programme, c) deal with new and emerging threats; and d) teach ICAO aviation security training courses. The new list will be compiled based on merit and professional experience in aviation and aviation security. The prerequisites included in **Appendix B** are required for all potential candidates.

5.2 Anyone who meets these requirements and may be interested in carrying out aviation security missions on behalf of ICAO is encouraged to submit his/her resume to: Jhaidar@icao.int, and copy Mrs. Wendy Kiley-Valiquet, wkiley-valiquet@icao.int. States are encouraged to forward this information to any qualified individuals in their administrations.

6. Aviation Security Training Programme

6.1 ICAO has established a network of 16 designated Aviation Security Training Centres (ASTC) around the world three of which are in the CAR/SAM regions. Every year, ICAO publishes an annual aviation security training programme incorporating courses in the various disciplines of the aviation security field which are conducted at the ASTCs. The 2006 Regional ASTCs schedules are as follows:

6.2 The course programme of the ICAO Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, is as follows:

- Airport Security Programme Workshop
3-7 April 2006 (5 working days)
- Screener Certification Workshop
1-5 August, 2006 (5 working days)

6.3 The course programme of the ICAO Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) in Quito, Ecuador (Spanish), is as follows:

- National Civil Aviation Security Programme Workshop
1-5 September 2006 (5 working days)
- Hostage Negotiation
1-5 October 2006 (5 working days)

6.4 The course programme of the ICAO Sub-Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Spanish), is as follows:

- Airport Security Programme Workshop
15-19 May 2006 (5 working days)
- Instructors Certification
1-5 December 2006 (5 Working days)

6.5 CAD is responsible for the development of all Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTP) that are provided to all members of the ASTC network. CAD is also planning to develop new aviation security training packages during 2006, to include airport and aircraft security design, new and emerging threats in civil aviation, screener certification and national quality control.

6.6 In 2005, the following new training packages were made available:

- ASTP/Airport Design (English, French, Spanish)
- ASTP/Quality Control (English, French, Spanish)
- ASTP/National Auditors-Inspectors (English, French, Spanish)
- ASTP/Certification of AVSEC Instructors (English, French, Spanish)
- ASTP/Certification of AVSEC Staff (English)

7. Annex 9 and Machine Readable Travel Documents

7.1 Through its Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch (S&F), ICAO pursues the objective to facilitate and strengthen border clearance and security measures in airports and to reduce landside congestion, with a three-part strategy: standardization of passports, visas and other travel documents; improvement of inspection processes with the use of modern technology; and tackling of related security problems. Priorities of the programme include: updating of Standards and Recommended Practices in Annex 9- Facilitation; development and implementation of specification for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) including identity confirmation with biometrics; modernization of border control processes; security and facilitation of the international supply chain; and contingency measures to address health emergencies of international concern.

7.2 The Facilitation Division and the Facilitation Panel assist the Council and Air Transport Committee with amendments to Annex 9. The Technical Advisory Group on Machine-Readable Travel Documents (TAG/MRTD) assists the Secretariat with updating the specifications for MRTDs in the Doc 9303 series. The Secretariat uses regional seminars, Universal Implementation of the MRTD Programme, regional staff missions and a network of Facilitation contact persons to promote the implementation of the aforementioned standards and specifications. The Aviation Security Regional Officer is currently establishing a communication network for National Facilitation Officials in the CAR/SAM Regions. For more information contact David Flores floresd@mexico.icao.int

7.2.1 *Selected Relevant Documents:*

- Annex 9- Facilitation (12 Edition, 2005)
- Doc 9303, Part 1 to 3: Machine Readable Travel Documents
- Circular 309: Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data (April 2006)

7.2.2 *Reports of Recent Meetings:*

- TAG-MRTD/16- Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents (26 to 28 September 2005)
- Symposium on ICAO-Standard MRTDs and Biometric Enhancement (with exhibition):
Web site: <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal/MRTDsymposium/index.html>
MRTD Web site: www.icao.int/mrtd

8. **ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)**

8.1 The ICAO USAP AVSEC Audits in States commenced in November 2002 and are currently being conducted on the basis of the audit schedule sent to States. As of 31 March 2006, 114 audit missions have been conducted, 40 of which took place in 2005. Five Follow-up visits in the region were conducted in 2005, in Bolivia, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Paraguay. Seven of these Follow-up visits are scheduled for 2006, in Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. An audit activity report detailing the audits conducted is set forth in **Appendix C** to this paper.

8.2 The audit schedule relating to missions to be conducted in 2006 and 2007 is attached to this paper as **Appendices D** and **E**. Eight Audits are scheduled in the region for 2006, in Argentina, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Uruguay. And three Audits are scheduled for 2007, in Belize, Haiti and Panama. The Audit Schedule involves actual mission dates which will be coordinated directly with the State concerned. Four to six months prior to the date of the audit, Contracting States scheduled for an audit mission will be sent a customized Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for confirmation of agreement on its terms, based upon the model bilateral MoU endorsed by the Council of ICAO.

9. **Organization of American States (OAS) Counter Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)**

9.1 The Organization of American States (OAS) Counter Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) offered thirty (30) fellowships for National Aviation Security Officials in the region wishing to attend the Hold Baggage Screening Seminar/Meeting on 28 November 2005, in Monterrey, Mexico. Twenty-four (24) fellowships (14 of which were for the CAR Region) were processed by OAS/CICTE for this event and their Director, Kevin Newmeyer was in attendance. He recently stated that OAS/CICTE plan to continue to work with ICAO and support ICAO sponsored AVSEC training events by offering more fellowships for 2006.

10. **ICAO/Canada Aviation Security Awareness Training Programme Phase II**

10.1 Transport Canada and ICAO are currently working to complete a proposal called "Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Programme" which entails aviation security (AVSEC) workshops, courses and seminars in the CAR/SAM Regions from 2006-2009, targeted for the Civil Aviation

Aeronautical Authorities and may include airports, air operators and airport policing authorities. The AVSEC topics for these events will include but are not limited to Airport Security Programme, National Civil Aviation Security Programme, National Quality Control Programme, Passenger Screening, Cargo Security Programme and Human Factors.

11. Aviation Security/Facilitation Seminar at the Dominican Republic

11.1 The ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau hosted an Aviation Security and Facilitation Seminar in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic on 27-30 June 2006. The event was coordinated with the ICAO Security and Facilitation Branch (S&F) and the ICAO North America Central America and Caribbean (NACC) Office. The topics were Annex 17 Amendment 11, Annex 9, Quality Control, Biometrically Enhanced (ePassport), Hold Baggage Screening, Changes in the S&F Branch, Machine Readable Travel Documents, USAP Programme, AVSEC COMM Initiatives, Air Cargo Security, Border Control & Clearance, Threat and Risk Assessment, Passenger/Baggage Screening and Human Factors. 120 participants from 13 States, 5 International Organizations and 10 Companies attended this seminar.

12. Aviation Security Point (POC)

12.1 Pursuant to the view expressed by the G8 Roma-Lyon Crime and Terrorism Group, an ICAO-wide Aviation Security Point of Contact (POC) Network has been established for the communication of imminent threats to civil air transport operations. The objective of the POC is to provide a network of international aviation security contacts within each State, who are designated as the appropriate authority to send and receive communications, at any time of the day or night, concerning imminent threat information, security requests of an urgent nature, and/or guidelines to support security requirements in the case of countering an imminent threat. Points of contact need to be available at all times, engaged in the threat assessment process and close to the decision making process for aviation security procedures.

12.2 Due to the sensitivity of the information to be contained in the Network, strict control must be exercised as failure to do so may compromise efforts and future security implementation endeavours. Consequently, in order to maintain control over this information, participating States should take into account the following:

- a) access to the ICAO Aviation Security POC Network will be confined to those States that have placed their own contact details in the database and have been issued a password by ICAO;
- b) Aviation Security POC Network participants will have an obligation to ensure that their contact details are kept up to date;
- c) participating States will be required to ensure physical protection of access to the POC Network, confining access to those with genuine need for it in order to discharge their duties;
- d) participating States will commit to having internal procedures for ensuring that contacts made via the POC Network are handled expeditiously, consistent with their urgency; and
- e) participation in the POC Network will be made conditional on the State agreeing to abide with the above directives.

12.3 States/Territories who wish to participate in the ICAO Aviation Security POC Network, please complete the form included in **Appendix F** to this working paper and send it directly to the Chief, Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch, ICAO, fax; + 1 (514) 954-6408, e-mail: avsec@icao.int

13. Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC COMM)

13.1 The AVSEC COMM/5 5th Annual meeting was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in conjunction with the 10th Annual la CLAC Group of AVSEC Experts on 8-13 May 2006. The AVSEC COMM meeting discussed AVSEC topics such as Hold Baggage Screening (HBS) Final Report findings and Action Plan, Quality Control Programme, Cargo Security Programme, AVSEC Instructor/Consultant Directory, National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme, Passenger Screening Programme, Passenger Screening Seminar and Regional Mechanism for sharing threat information. The Meeting was attended by 31 participants from 10 Member States and 5 Contracting States located or having Territories in the CAR/SAM Regions, and observers from 4 International Organizations. One Ad Hoc Group was established to review the Final Hold Baggage Screening Report and two Task Forces were established to develop guidance for Cargo Security and Passenger/Cabin Baggage Screening Programs. A third Task Force was established to work on the Annex 9 (Facilitation) provisions. The AVSEC COMM approved the establishment of a Passenger/Cabin Baggage Screening Seminar/Meeting to assist States with current screening procedures and technologies. Jamaica volunteered to host the event on 13-17 November 2006, in Montego Bay, Jamaica.

14. Action Required by the Meeting

14.1 The Meeting is invited to

- a) note the content of this paper and take any action which is considered appropriate to encourage regional cooperation and timely implementation by States/Territories of the new AVSEC requirements; and
- b) adopt the following Draft Conclusions:

DRAFT**CONCLUSION 30/X****RECRUITMENT OF AVSEC PROFESSIONALS**

That the E/CAR States/Territories:

- a) review the ICAO prerequisites and forward this information to AVSEC qualified individuals in their administrations; and
- b) encourage qualified individuals to apply with ICAO to assist States with the enhancement of their AVSEC Programmes

DRAFT**CONCLUSION 30/X****AVSEC POINT OF CONTACT (POC) NETWORK**

That the E/CAR States/Territories:

- a) review the criteria information and designate the appropriate authority to receive imminent threats to civil air transport operations through this Network and;
- b) as soon as practical sign up with ICAO using the appropriate form for the Aviation Security Point of Contact (POC) Network.

APPENDIX A

AMENDMENT No. 11

TO THE

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

SECURITY

SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

ANNEX 17

TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

The amendment to Annex 17 contained in this document was adopted by the Council of ICAO on **30 November 2005**. Such parts of this amendment as have not been disapproved by more than half of the total number of Contracting States on or before **10 April 2006** will become effective on that date and will become applicable on **1 July 2006** as specified in the Resolution of Adoption.

NOVEMBER 2005

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**AMENDMENT 11 TO THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES**

SECURITY — ANNEX 17

RESOLUTION OF ADOPTION

The Council

Acting in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and particularly with the provisions of Articles 37, 54 and 90 thereof,

1. *Hereby adopts* on 30 November 2005 Amendment 11 to the International Standards and Recommended Practices contained in the document entitled *Security — Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference*, which for convenience is designated Annex 17 to the Convention;
2. *Prescribes* 10 April 2006 as the date upon which the said Amendment shall become effective, except for any part thereof in respect of which a majority of the Contracting States have registered their disapproval with the Council before that date;
3. *Resolves* that the said Amendment or such parts thereof as have become effective shall become applicable on 1 July 2006;
4. *Requests the Secretary General:*
 - a) to notify each Contracting State immediately of the above action and immediately after 10 April 2006 of those parts of the Amendment which have become effective;
 - b) to request each Contracting State:
 - 1) to notify the Organization (in accordance with the obligation imposed by Article 38 of the Convention) of the differences that will exist on 1 July 2006 between its national regulations or practices and the provisions of the Standards in the Annex as hereby amended, such notification to be made before 1 June 2006, and thereafter to notify the Organization of any further differences that arise;
 - 2) to notify the Organization before 1 June 2006 of the date or dates by which it will have complied with the provisions of the Standards in the Annex as hereby amended;
 - c) to invite each Contracting State to notify additionally any differences between its own practices and those established by the Recommended Practices, when the notification of such differences is important for the safety of air navigation, following the procedure specified in subparagraph b) above with respect to differences from Standards.

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NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ANNEX 17

The text of the proposed amendment is arranged to show deleted text with a line through it and new text highlighted with grey shading, as shown below:

1. ~~Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it~~ text to be deleted
2. **New text to be inserted is highlighted with grey shading** new text to be inserted
3. ~~Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it~~ followed **new text to replace existing text**
by the replacement text which is highlighted with grey shading

TEXT OF AMENDMENT 11 TO
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

SECURITY

ANNEX 17

TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS

Acts of Unlawful Interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation and air transport, i.e.

- unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight,
- unlawful seizure of aircraft on the ground,
- hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
- forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
- introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes,
- communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.

Aerial work. An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialized services such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial advertisement, etc.

Airside. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is controlled.

Aircraft Security Check. An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.

Aircraft Security Search. A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.

Background Check. A check of a person's identity and previous experience, including where legally permissible, any criminal history, ~~where appropriate~~, as part of the assessment of an individual's suitability to implement a security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted area.

Cargo. Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled baggage.

Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority.

Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire.

Corporate Aviation. The non-commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the carriage of passengers or goods as an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a professional pilot employed to fly the aircraft. (note that Corporate Aviation is a subset of General Aviation).

Disruptive passenger. A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.

General Aviation Operation. An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation or an aerial work operation.

Human Factors Principles. Principles which apply to design, certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration to human performance.

Human Performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety, security and efficiency of aeronautical operations.

Regulated Agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo, ~~courier and express parcels~~ or mail.

Screening. The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, ~~articles or substances~~ which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

Note.— Certain dangerous articles or substances are classified as dangerous goods by Annex 18 and the associated Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284) and must be transported in accordance with those instructions. In addition, the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted), Appendix 35, Prohibited Items provides a list of those articles that must never be carried in the cabin of an aircraft.

Security. Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources ~~intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.~~

Security Audit. An in-depth compliance examination of all aspects of the implementation of the national civil aviation security programme.

Security Control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be utilized ~~used~~ to commit an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.

Security Inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant national civil aviation security programme requirements by an airline, airport, or other entity involved in security.

Security Restricted Area. Those areas of the Airside ~~areas of an airport into which~~ are identified as priority risk areas where in addition to ~~access is controlled to ensure control,~~ other security controls are applied ~~of civil aviation~~. Such areas will normally include, *inter alia*, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including those where aircraft are being brought into service and screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises.

Security Survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities which could be exploited to carry out an act of unlawful interference, and the recommendation of corrective actions.

Security Test. A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an attempt to commit an unlawful act.

Unidentified Baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag, which is not picked up by or identified with a passenger.

CHAPTER 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

2.1 Objectives

2.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.

2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that such an organization, such regulations, practices and procedures:

- a) protect the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation; and
- b) are capable of responding rapidly to meet any increased security threat.

Editorial Note.— Existing paragraph 2.1.3 moved to Section 2.2.

~~2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference are applied to domestic operations to the extent practicable, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.~~

2.1.4 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should ensure appropriate protection of aviation security information.*

Note 1.— Guidance material on achieving civil aviation security objectives through application of the Standards and Recommended Practices in the following chapters is to be found in the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted).

Note 2.— The comprehensive aviation security training material to assist States in achieving civil aviation security objectives is contained in the ICAO Training Programme for Aviation Security comprising a series of Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs).

2.2 Applicability

2.2.1 Each Contracting States shall apply the Standards and shall endeavour to apply the Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17 to international civil aviation operations.

~~2.1.3~~ **2.2.2** Each Contracting State shall ensure that ~~principles governing measures~~ designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference ~~with international civil aviation~~ are applied to domestic operations to the extent practicable, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

~~2.2~~ 2.3 Security and facilitation

Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the security controls and procedures to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation provided the effectiveness of these controls and procedures is not compromised.*

~~2.3~~ 2.4 International cooperation

~~2.3.1~~ **2.4.1** Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other Contracting States for ~~special additional~~ security ~~controls~~ measures in respect of a specific flight(s) ~~or specified flights~~ by operators of such other States are met, as far as may be practicable. The requesting State shall give consideration to alternative measures of the other State that are equivalent to those requested.

~~2.3.2~~ **2.4.2** Each Contracting State shall cooperate with other States ~~in relation to their respective national civil aviation security programmes~~ in the development and exchange of information concerning national civil aviation security programmes, training programmes and quality control programmes, as necessary.

~~2.3.3~~ Each Contracting State shall cooperate with other States in the development and exchange of information concerning training programmes, as necessary.

~~2.3.4~~ **2.4.3** Each Contracting State shall **establish and implement procedures to** share with other Contracting States threat information that applies to the aviation security interests of those States, to the extent practicable.

~~2.3.5~~ **2.4.4** Each Contracting State shall ~~provide~~ **establish and implement** suitable protection and handling procedures for ~~sensitive~~ security information shared by other Contracting States, or ~~sensitive~~ security information that affects the security interests of other Contracting States, in order to ensure that inappropriate use or disclosure of such information is avoided.

2.4.5 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should share, as appropriate, and consistent with its sovereignty, the results of the audit carried out by ICAO and the corrective actions taken by the audited State if requested by another State.*

~~2.3.6~~ **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should cooperate with other States in the field of research and development of new security equipment which will better achieve civil aviation security objectives.* [See 2.5.1]

~~2.3.7~~ **2.4.6 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should include in each of its bilateral agreements on air transport a clause related to aviation security, taking into account the model clause developed by ICAO.*

~~2.3.8~~ **2.4.7 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should make available to other Contracting States on request a written version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation security programme.*

2.4.8 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should notify ICAO where it has shared information under 2.4.5.*

~~2.4~~ 2.5 Equipment, research and development

~~2.4.1~~ **2.5.1 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should promote research and development of new security equipment, processes and procedures which will better achieve civil aviation security objectives and should co-operate with other Contracting States in this matter.*

~~2.4.2~~ **2.5.2 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that the development of new security equipment takes into consideration Human Factors principles.*

Note.— *Guidance material regarding Human Factors principles can be found in the Human Factors Digest — Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations* (Doc 9808) and in Part 1, Chapter 4 of the Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683).*

CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION

3.1 National organization and appropriate authority

3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written national civil aviation security programme to safeguard civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, through

*In preparation

regulations practices and procedures which take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.

3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO an appropriate authority within its administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme.

~~3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures, which together provide the security necessary for the operation of aircraft in normal operating conditions and capable of responding rapidly to meet any increased security threat. [See 2.1.2 and 3.1.1]~~

3.1.4 ~~3.1.3~~ Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level of threat to civil aviation operations within its territory, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

Note.— Guidance material regarding threat assessment and risk management methodologies can be found in the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted).

~~3.1.5~~ 3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.

3.1.6 ~~3.1.5~~ Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation security committee or similar arrangements for the purpose of coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.

~~3.1.7~~ 3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure the development and implementation of a national training programmes to ensure the effectiveness of its for personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme. ~~These~~ This training programmes shall include training of civil aviation security personnel in human performance be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the national civil aviation security programme.

~~— Note.— Guidance material on training in human performance can be found in the Security Manual for Safe guarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted); the Human Factors Digest — Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations*; and in Part 2, Chapter 1 of the Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683).~~

3.1.7 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that trainers and training programmes meet standards defined by the appropriate authority.*

3.1.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the appropriate authority arranges for the supporting resources and facilities required by the aviation security services to be available at each airport serving international civil aviation.

3.1.9 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State ~~should~~ **shall** make available to its airport and aircraft operators operating in its territory and other entities concerned, a written version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation security programme and/or relevant information or guidelines enabling them to meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme.

3.2 Airport operations

3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving ~~international~~ civil aviation to establish, ~~and implement~~ **and maintain** a written airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the national ~~civil~~ aviation security programme.

3.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ~~arrange for~~ **ensure that** an authority at each airport serving ~~international~~ civil aviation ~~to be~~ **is** responsible for coordinating the implementation of security controls.

3.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ~~arrange for the establishment of~~ **ensure that** an airport security committee at each airport serving ~~international~~ civil aviation **is established** to assist the authority mentioned under 3.2.2 in its role of coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in the airport security programme.

Editorial Note.— Existing paragraphs 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 have been moved to Section 5.1.

~~3.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are developed and resources made available to safeguard civil aviation, against acts of unlawful interference. The contingency plans shall be practised and exercised on a regular basis.~~

~~3.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized and suitably trained personnel are readily available for deployment at its airports serving international civil aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation.~~

~~3.2.6~~ **3.2.4** Each Contracting State shall ensure that **airport design requirements, including the** architectural and infrastructure-related requirements necessary for the ~~optimum~~ **implementation of civil aviation** ~~the security measures in the national civil aviation security programme,~~ are integrated into the design and construction of new facilities and alterations to existing facilities at airports.

3.3 Aircraft operators

3.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ~~require~~ **ensure that** commercial air transport operators providing service from that State ~~to have~~ **established, and implemented and maintained** a written operator security programme ~~appropriate to that~~ **meets** the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that State.

3.3.2 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should ensure that each entity conducting general aviation operations, including corporate aviation operations, using aircraft with a maximum take-off mass greater than 5,700 kg, has established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that State.*

3.3.3 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should ensure that each entity conducting aerial work operations has established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that State. The programme shall contain operations features specific to the type of operations conducted.*

~~3.3.2~~ **3.3.4 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should take into account the ICAO model as a basis for operators' or entities' security programmes under 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.*

~~3.3.3~~ **3.3.5 Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should require operators providing service from that State and participating in code-sharing or other collaborative arrangements with other ~~international~~ operators to notify the appropriate authority of the nature of these arrangements, including the identity of the other operators.*

3.4 Quality control

3.4.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing security controls are subject to background checks and selection procedures.

3.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing security controls possess all competencies required to perform their duties and are appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme ~~and possess all competencies required to perform their duties~~ and that appropriate records are maintained up to date. Relevant standards of performance shall be established and initial and periodic assessments shall be introduced to maintain those standards.

3.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out screening operations are certified according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme ~~to ensure that performance standards are consistently and reliably achieved.~~

3.4.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ~~ensure the development, implementation and maintenance of~~ a national civil aviation security quality control programme to ~~ensure~~ determine compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security programme.

3.4.5 Each Contracting State shall ~~arrange for surveys to identify security needs, arrange for inspections of the implementation of security controls and arrange tests of security controls to assess their effectiveness~~ ensure that the implementation of security measures is regularly subjected to verification of compliance with the national civil aviation security programme. The priorities and frequency of monitoring shall be determined on the basis of risk assessment carried out by the relevant authorities.

3.4.6 Each Contracting State shall arrange for security audits, tests, surveys and inspections to be conducted on a regular basis, to verify compliance with the national civil aviation security programme and to provide for the rapid and effective rectification of any deficiencies.

3.4.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the management, setting of priorities and organization of the national civil aviation security quality control programme shall be undertaken independently from the entities and persons responsible for the implementation of the measures taken under the national civil aviation security programme, and

- a) ensure that the personnel carrying out security audits, tests, surveys and inspections are trained to appropriate standards for these tasks in accordance with the national civil aviation security programme;
- b) ensure that the personnel carrying out security audits, tests, surveys and inspections are afforded the necessary authority to obtain information to carry out these tasks and to enforce corrective actions;
- c) supplement the national civil aviation security quality control programme by establishing a confidential reporting system for analyzing security information provided by sources such as passengers, crew, ground personnel, etc.; and
- d) establish a process to record and analyze the results of the national civil aviation security quality control programme, to contribute to the effective development and implementation of the national civil aviation security programme, including identifying the causes and patterns of non-compliance and verifying that corrective actions have been implemented and sustained.

~~3.4.6~~ **3.4.8** Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall require its appropriate authority to re-evaluate security controls and procedures and **in a timely fashion** take action necessary to remedy weaknesses so as to prevent recurrence. These actions shall be ~~notified~~ **shared with** ~~to~~ ICAO.

~~3.4.7~~ **Recommendation.** ~~Each Contracting State should require that the effectiveness of individual aviation security measures be assessed by considering their role in the overall system performance of aviation security systems.~~

CHAPTER 4. PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

4.1 Objective

Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, **articles or substances**, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in ~~international~~ civil aviation.

Editorial Note.— Section 4.7 has been moved to 4.2

4.2 Measures relating to access control

4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the access to airside areas at airports serving civil aviation is controlled in order to prevent unauthorized entry.

~~4.7.1~~ **4.2.2** Each Contracting State shall ensure that security restricted areas are established at each airport serving ~~international~~ civil aviation ~~and that procedures and identification systems are implemented in respect of persons and vehicles~~ designated by the State based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification systems are established in respect of persons and vehicles in order to prevent unauthorized access to airside areas and security restricted areas. Identity shall be verified at designated checkpoints before access is allowed to airside areas and security restricted areas.

4.7.24.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that ~~appropriate security controls, including background checks are conducted~~ on persons other than passengers granted unescorted access to security restricted areas of the airport, ~~are implemented~~ prior to granting access to security restricted areas.

4.7.34.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ~~require that measures are implemented to ensure adequate supervision over~~ ensure that the movement of persons and vehicles to and from the aircraft is supervised in security restricted areas in order to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.

4.7.54.2.6 **Recommendation**—Each Contracting State ~~should~~ shall ensure that, at a minimum, a proportion of persons other than passengers being granted access to security restricted areas, together with items carried, are screened ~~at random~~. The proportion should be determined in accordance with risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

4.7.44.2.7 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that identity documents issued to aircraft crew members ~~conform~~ provide a harmonized and reliable international basis for recognition and validation of documentation to permit authorized access to airside and security restricted areas by conforming to the relevant specifications set forth in Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents.*

4.7.64.2.8 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that checks specified in 4.7.2 4.2.4 be reapplied on a regular basis to all persons granted unescorted access to security restricted areas.*

4.24.3 Measures relating to aircraft

4.2.14.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks of originating aircraft ~~assigned to international flights~~ engaged in commercial air transport movements are performed or an aircraft security search is carried out. The determination of whether it is an aircraft security check or a search that is appropriate shall be based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.

4.2.24.3.2 Each Contracting State shall ~~require~~ ensure that measures to be taken in respect of flights under an increased threat to ensure that ~~disembarking~~ passengers of commercial flights disembarking from the aircraft at any time do not leave items on board the aircraft ~~at transit stops on its airports~~.

4.2.34.3.3 Each Contracting State shall require its commercial air transport operators to take adequate measures as appropriate to ensure that during flight unauthorized persons are prevented from entering the flight crew compartment.

Note.— Provisions for security of the flight crew compartment of aircraft engaged in commercial air transportation are contained in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13, Section 13.2.

4.3.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that an aircraft subject to 4.3.1 is protected from unauthorized interference from the time the aircraft search or check has commenced until the aircraft departs.

4.3.5 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that security controls are established to prevent acts of unlawful interference with aircraft when they are not in security restricted areas.*

4.3.4.4 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage

4.3.1 4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations departing from a security restricted area.

4.3.2 4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer and transit passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin baggage are subjected to adequate security controls to prevent unauthorized articles from being taken on board aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations. screened prior to boarding an aircraft, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such passengers and their cabin baggage have been screened to an appropriate level at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening at the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.

Note.— See guidance material on this issue in the Security Manual For Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 – Restricted).

4.3.3 4.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that there is no possibility of mixing or contact between passengers and their cabin baggage which have been screened are protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening until they board their aircraft. subjected to security control and other persons not subjected to such control after the security screening points at airports serving international civil aviation have been passed; If mixing or contact does take place, the passengers concerned and their cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft.

4.4.4 Each Contracting State shall establish at an airport measures for transit operations to protect transit passengers, cabin baggage from unauthorized interference and protect the integrity of the security of the airport of transit.

4.4.4.5 Measures relating to hold baggage

4.4.1 4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage is subjected to appropriate security controls is screened prior to being loaded into an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation commercial air transport operations departing from a security restricted area.

4.4.2 4.5.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that all hold baggage intended for carriage on passenger flights to be carried on a commercial aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the point it is checked in, whether at an airport or elsewhere, until it is placed on board an aircraft screened or accepted into the care of the carrier, whichever is earlier, until departure of the aircraft on which it is to be carried. If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized, the hold baggage shall be re-screened before being placed on board an aircraft.

~~4.4.3~~^{4.5.3} Each Contracting State shall ~~establish measures to ensure that~~ commercial air transport operators ~~when providing service from that State~~ do not transport the baggage of passengers who are not on board the aircraft unless that baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to appropriate security controls which may include additional screening.

~~4.4.4~~ Each Contracting State shall require the establishment of secure storage areas at airports serving international civil aviation, where mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or disposed of in accordance with local laws.

~~4.4.5~~ Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that consignments checked in as baggage by courier services for carriage on passenger aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations are screened.

~~4.4.6~~^{4.5.4} Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold baggage is subjected to appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized articles from being taken on board aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations. screened prior to being loaded into an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such hold baggage has been screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.

Note.— See guidance material on this issue in the Security Manual For Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 – Restricted).

~~4.4.7~~^{4.5.5} Each Contracting State shall ~~establish measures to ensure that~~ aircraft commercial air transport operators ~~when providing a passenger service from that State~~ transport only transport items of hold baggage which is authorized for carriage in accordance with the requirements specified in the national civil aviation security programme. have been individually identified as accompanied or unaccompanied, screened to the appropriate standard and accepted for carriage on that flight by the air carrier. All such baggage should be recorded as meeting these criteria and authorized for carriage on that flight.

~~4.4.8~~ From 1 January 2006, each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be carried in an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is screened prior to being loaded into the aircraft. [see 4.5.1]

~~4.4.9~~ **Recommendation.** ~~Each Contracting State should establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be carried in an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is screened prior to being loaded into the aircraft.~~ [see 4.5.1]

~~4.4.10~~^{4.5.6} **Recommendation.** ~~Each Contracting State should take the necessary measures to ensure that establish procedures to deal with unidentified baggage is placed in a protected and isolated area until such time as it is ascertained that it does not contain any explosives or other dangerous device in accordance with a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.~~

4.5 4.6 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods

~~— 4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure the implementation of measures at airports serving international civil aviation to protect cargo, baggage, mail, stores and operators' supplies being moved within an airport and intended for carriage on an aircraft to safeguard such aircraft against an act of unlawful interference.~~

~~— 4.5.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that cargo, courier and express parcels and mail intended for carriage on passenger flights are subjected to appropriate security controls.~~

~~— 4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that operators do not accept consignments of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail for carriage on passenger flights unless the security of such consignments is accounted for by a regulated agent or such consignments are subjected to other security controls to meet the requirements of 4.5.2.~~

4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security controls are applied to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded into an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air transport operations.

4.6.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried on a passenger commercial aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.

4.6.3 Each Contracting State shall establish a process for approval of regulated agents, if such agents are involved in implementing security controls.

4.6.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators do not accept cargo or mail for carriage in an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air transport operations unless the application of security controls is confirmed and accounted for by a regulated agent, or such consignments are subjected to appropriate security controls.

~~4.5.4~~ 4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that catering, supplies and operators' stores and supplies intended for carriage on passenger commercial flights are subjected to appropriate security controls and thereafter protected until loaded onto the aircraft.

4.6.6 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that security controls to be applied to cargo and mail for transportation on all-cargo aircraft are determined on the basis of a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.*

4.6 4.7 Measures relating to special categories of passengers

4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall develop requirements for air carriers for the carriage of potentially disruptive passengers who are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.

Note.— See guidance material on this issue found in the Security Manual For Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted).

~~4.6.3~~ ~~4.7.2~~ Each Contracting State shall ~~require~~ ~~ensure that~~ operators providing service from that State, ~~to include in their security programmes, measures and procedures to ensure safety on board their aircraft when passengers are to be carried who are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.~~

~~4.6.1~~ ~~4.7.3~~ Each Contracting State shall ~~establish measures to ensure that the aircraft operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings, in order that appropriate security controls can be applied.~~

~~4.6.4~~ ~~4.7.4~~ Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons on board aircraft, by law enforcement officers and other authorized persons, acting in the performance of their duties, requires special authorization in accordance with the laws of the States involved.

~~4.6.5~~ ~~4.7.5~~ Each Contracting State shall consider requests by any other State to allow the travel of armed personnel, ~~including In-Flight Security Officers~~, on board aircraft of operators of the requesting State. Only after agreement by all States involved shall such travel be allowed.

~~4.6.6~~ ~~4.7.6~~ Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons in other cases is allowed only when an authorized and duly qualified person has determined that they are not loaded, if applicable, and then only if stowed in a place inaccessible to any person during flight time.

~~4.7.7~~ Each Contracting State that decides to deploy In-Flight Security Officers shall ensure that they are government personnel who are especially selected and trained, taking into account the safety and security aspects on board an aircraft and deployed according to the threat assessment of the competent authority. The deployment of such officers shall be co-ordinated with concerned States and kept strictly confidential.

~~4.6.2~~ ~~4.7.8~~ Each Contracting State shall ensure that the pilot-in-command is notified as to the number of armed persons and their seat location.

~~4.7—Measures relating to access control~~

Editorial Note.— Section 4.7 has been moved to 4.2

CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF RESPONSE TO ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

5.1 Prevention

5.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures, ~~when reliable information to safeguard aircraft when a well founded suspicion exists that the an aircraft may be subjected to an act of unlawful interference, to safeguard the aircraft if it is still while on the ground and to provide as much prior notification as possible of the arrival of such aircraft to relevant airport authorities and air traffic services of the States concerned if the aircraft has already departed.~~

5.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ~~establish procedures, which include notification to the operator, for inspecting aircraft, when a well founded suspicion~~ ensure, when reliable information exists that ~~the an aircraft may be the object of~~ subjected to an act of unlawful interference, ~~that the aircraft is searched for~~

concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances. Prior notification of the search shall be provided to the operator concerned.

5.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that arrangements are made for the investigation, render safe and/or disposal of, if necessary, of suspected sabotage dangerous devices or other potential hazards at airports serving international civil aviation.

3.2.4 5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are developed and resources made available to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. The contingency plans shall be tested on a regular basis.

3.2.5 5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized and suitably trained personnel are readily available for deployment at its airports serving civil aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

5.2 Response

5.2.1 Each Contracting State shall take adequate appropriate measures for the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft, which is subjected to an act of unlawful interference, while on the ground in the territory of the Contracting State, which is subjected to an act of unlawful interference until their journey can be continued.

5.2.2 Each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic services for an aircraft which is the subject of an act of unlawful interference shall collect all pertinent information on the flight of that aircraft and transmit that information to all other States responsible for the Air Traffic Services units concerned, including those at the airport of known or presumed destination, so that timely and appropriate safeguarding action may be taken en route and at the aircraft's known, likely or possible destination.

5.2.3 Each Contracting State shall provide such assistance to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including the provision of navigation aids, air traffic services and permission to land as may be necessitated by the circumstances.

5.2.4 Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is detained on the ground unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life. However, these measures need to recognize the grave hazard attending further flight. States shall also recognize the importance of consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where that aircraft has landed and the State of the Operator of the aircraft, and notification by the State where the aircraft has landed to the States of assumed or stated destination.

5.2.5 Each Contracting State in which an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed shall notify by the most expeditious means the State of Registry of the aircraft and the State of the Operator of the landing and shall similarly transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant information to:

- a) the two above-mentioned States;
- b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;

- c) each State whose citizens were detained as hostages;
- d) each ~~Contracting~~ State whose citizens are known to be on board the aircraft; and
- e) the International Civil Aviation Organization.

5.2.6 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should ensure that information received as a consequence of action taken in accordance with 5.2.2 is distributed locally to the Air Traffic Services units concerned, the appropriate airport administrations, the operator and others concerned as soon as practicable.*

5.2.7 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should cooperate with other States for the purpose of providing a joint response in connection with an act of unlawful interference. When taking measures in their territory to free passengers and crew members of an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference, each Contracting State should use, as necessary, the experience and capability of the State of the Operator, the State of manufacture and the State of Registry of that aircraft.*

5.3 Exchange of information and reporting

5.3.1 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act is resolved.

5.3.2 Recommendation.— *Each Contracting State should exchange information with other Contracting States as considered appropriate; on the management of response at the same time supplying such information to ICAO, related to plans, designs, equipment, methods and procedures for safeguarding civil aviation against to an acts of unlawful interference, at the same time supplying such information to ICAO.*

Editorial Note.— The Attachments, which contain extracts from other ICAO publications, will be updated when replacement pages are issued.

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**NOTE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF DIFFERENCES TO ANNEX 17
AND FORM OF NOTIFICATION**

(Prepared and issued in accordance with instructions of the Council)

1. *Introduction*

1.1 The Assembly and the Council, when reviewing the notification of differences received in compliance with Article 38 of the Convention, have repeatedly noted that the state of such reporting is not entirely satisfactory.

1.2 With a view to achieving a more comprehensive coverage, this note is issued to facilitate the determination and reporting of such differences and to state the primary purpose of such reporting.

1.3 The primary purpose of reporting of differences is to promote safety and efficiency in air navigation by ensuring that governmental and other agencies, including operators, concerned with international civil aviation are made aware of all national rules and practices in so far as they differ from those prescribed in the ICAO Standards.

1.4 Contracting States are, therefore, requested to give particular attention to the notification before 1 June 2006 of differences with respect to Standards in Annex 17. The Council has also invited Contracting States to extend the above considerations to Recommended Practices.

1.5 Contracting States are asked to note further that it is necessary to make an explicit statement of intent to comply where such intent exists, or where such is not the intent, of the difference or differences that will exist. This statement should be made with respect to the whole of the Annex, i.e. not only to the latest amendment but to the whole Annex, including the amendment.

1.6 If previous notifications have been made in respect of this Annex, detailed repetition may be avoided, if appropriate, by stating the current validity of the earlier notification.

2. *Notification of differences to Annex 17, including Amendment 11*

2.1 Past experience has indicated that the reporting of differences to Annex 17 has in some instances been too extensive since some appear merely to be a different manner of expressing the same intent.

2.2 Guidance to Contracting States on the reporting of differences to Annex 17 can only be given in very general terms. Where the national regulations of States call for compliance with procedures that are not identical but essentially the same as those contained in the Annex, no difference should be reported since the details of the procedures existing are the subject of notification through the medium of aeronautical information publications. Although differences to Recommended Practices are not notifiable under Article 38 of the Convention, Contracting States are invited to notify the Organization of the differences between their national regulations and practices and any corresponding Recommended Practices contained in an Annex when the knowledge of such differences is important for the safety of air navigation. Broadly, the determination should be based on the following criteria in so far as they are applicable:

- a) When the national regulations of a Contracting State affect the operation of aircraft of other Contracting States in and above its territory:

- 1) by imposing an obligation within the scope of an Annex which is not covered by an ICAO Standard;
 - 2) by imposing an obligation different in character* from that of the corresponding ICAO Standard;
 - 3) by being more exacting than the corresponding ICAO Standard;
 - 4) by being less protective than the corresponding ICAO Standard;
- b) When the national regulations of a Contracting State applicable to its aircraft and their maintenance, as well as to aircrew personnel, engaged in international air operations over the territory of another Contracting State:
- 1) are different in character* from the corresponding ICAO Standard;
 - 2) are less protective than the corresponding ICAO Standard.
- c) When the facilities or services provided by a Contracting State for international air navigation:
- 1) impose an obligation or requirement for safety additional to any that may be imposed by the corresponding ICAO Standard;
 - 2) while not imposing an additional obligation, differ in principle, type or system from the corresponding ICAO Standard;
 - 3) are less protective than the corresponding ICAO Standard.

2.3 For States that have already fully reported differences from Annex 17 or have reported that no differences exist, the reporting of any further differences occasioned by the amendment should be relatively straightforward; however, attention is called to paragraph 1.5 wherein it is indicated that this statement should be made with respect to the whole of the Annex, i.e. not only to the amendment itself but to the Annex as amended.

3. *Form of notification of differences*

3.1 Differences should be notified in the following form:

- a) *Reference:* The number of the paragraphs or subparagraph in Annex 17 as amended which contains the Standard or Recommended Practice to which the difference relates;

* The expression “different in character” in a) 2) and b) 1) would be applied to a national regulation which achieves, by other means, the same objective as that of the corresponding ICAO Standard and so cannot be classified under a) 3) or 4) and b) 2).

- b) *Description of the difference*: Describe the difference precisely and include any additional information necessary to make its effect clear;
- c) *Remarks*: Under “Remarks” indicate any reasons for the “Difference”.

3.2 The differences notified will be recorded in a supplement to the Annex, normally in the terms used by the Contracting State when making the notification. In the interest of making the supplement as useful as possible, please make statements as clear and concise as possible and confine remarks to essential points. Comments on implementation, in accordance with paragraph 4 b) 2) of the Resolution of Adoption, should not be combined with those concerning differences.

3.3 A *pro forma* to facilitate the notification of differences is given in Attachment C to State letter AS 8/2.1-05/101.

— END —

APPENDIX B

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF AVSEC PROFESSIONALS

With the launch of a new ICAO strategy for aviation security assistance and development, and considering the continuously evolving and increasingly challenging nature of the aviation security field, the coordinated Assistance and Development section (CAD) in the Aviation security and Facilitation Branch, and Technical cooperation Bureau, are in the process of compiling a new roster of aviation security professionals. These professionals, if successfully recruited as short term experts will carry out ICAO aviation security missions to help ICAO contracting States; a) develop a sound aviation security infrastructure; b) correct aviation security deficiencies as revealed by the universal ICAO Aviation security programme, c) deal with new and emerging threats; d) teach ICAO aviation security training courses. The new list will be compiled based on merit and professional experience in aviation and aviation security. The following prerequisites are required for all potential candidates:

Required Experience:

1. A comprehensive and working knowledge of ICAO's Annex 17 to the convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago convention).
2. A comprehensive and working knowledge of ICAO Security Manual for the safeguarding of civil Aviation from Acts of unlawful Interference. (Doc.8973).
3. Working knowledge and familiarity with ICAO Annexes 6, (Aircraft Operations) 9, (Facilitation) 14, (Aerodromes) and 18, (Dangerous Goods).
4. 10 years of domestic and international working experience in aviation security policy, planning, organizational and operational experience.
5. Strong command of one of the 6 ICAO working languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, and one of any of the others.
6. Managerial skills in project management.
7. Working knowledge in aviation security training and familiar with the ICAO Aviation security Training programme.
8. Appreciation of, and ability to work with, people from different cultures.
9. Ability to travel anywhere around the world, including remote and high risk destinations.

Desirable experience:

1. Working experience in aviation management, airport operations (air and landside) operations, air carrier operations, aviation-related law enforcement operations.
2. Completion of ICAO aviation security training courses.
3. Certification as an ICAO aviation security auditing (USAP certification).
4. Risk and threat assessment (risk models and, geopolitical applications).
5. Airport security design and planning.
6. Cabin and flight deck experience.

Anyone who meets these requirements and may be interested in carrying out aviation security missions on behalf of ICAO is encouraged to submit his/her resume to me at Jhaidar@icao.int, and copy Mrs. Wendy Kiley-Valiquet, wkiley-valiquet@icao.int

Also, it would be greatly appreciated if you may forward this message to anyone qualified individuals in your administration.

Finally, we look forward to hearing from you with the Curriculum vitae of appropriate candidates.

Mr. Jalal Haidar
A/Chief Coordinated Assistance and Development (CAD) Section
Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch
International Civil Aviation Organization
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 5H7
Tel: 514 954 5837 Fax: 514 954 6408

APPENDIX C**ICAO UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)
AUDIT ACTIVITY REPORT****PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION AS OF 31 March 2006**

	STATE	AIRPORTS AUDITED	DATE OF AUDIT	FOLLOW-UP VISIT DATES
1.	Antigua and Barbuda	Antigua V.C. Bird International Airport (ANU)	November 2005	2007
2.	Canada	Toronto Pearson International Airport (YYZ)	May 2005	2007
3.	Costa Rica	San Jose Juan Santamaria International Airport (SJO)	February 2005	2007
4.	Cuba	Havana Jose Marti International Airport (HAV)	March 2004	March 2006
5.	El Salvador	San Salvador El Salvador International Airport (SAL)	August 2004	2006
6.	Guatemala	Guatemala City La Aurora International Airport (GUA)	January/February 2005	2007
7.	Honduras	Tegucigalpa Toncontin International Airport (TGU)	March 2004	2006
8.	Jamaica	Kingston Norman Manley International Airport (KIN)	September 2003	October 2005
9.	Mexico	Mexico City International (MEX) and Guadalajara Miguel Hidalgo (GDL) Airports	January 2004	May/June 2006
10.	Nicaragua	Managua Internacional Augusto C. Sandino Airport (MGA)	August/September 2004	September 2006
11.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	St. Kitts Robert L Bradshaw Airport (SKB)	November/December 2005	2007
12.	Trinidad and Tobago	Port of Spain Piarco International Airport (POS)	June/July 2003	October 2005
13.	United States	New York John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)	April 2005	2007

APPENDIX D**ICAO UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)
AUDIT SCHEDULE****JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2006**

First Quarter 2006 (January to March)	Second Quarter 2006 (April to June)
Dominican Republic	Grenada Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Third Quarter 2006 (July to September)	Fourth Quarter 2006 (October to December)
NONE	Barbados

APPENDIX E**ICAO UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)
AUDIT SCHEDULE****JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2007**

First Quarter 2007 (January to March)	Second Quarter 2007 (April to June)
NONE	NONE
Third Quarter 2007 (July to September)	Fourth Quarter 2007 (October to December)
NONE	Bahamas Belize Haiti

ATTACHMENT to State letter SP 48/1-06/19

AVIATION SECURITY POINT OF CONTACT (PoC) NETWORK

Sign-up Form

Please complete the following form and ensure that the contact-point is not only knowledgeable but that he or she is available on a 24-hour basis.

1. CONTACT, TELEPHONE NUMBER, FAX and E-MAIL (*Example: "Country: Command Centre, Aviation Security Department, City, Country, Telephone: 1 - 555 - 555- 1212, Fax: 1 -555 - 555-1212, E-mail "*)

Contact Person (s) (up to 3 persons)

Name: _____

Position/Department: _____

Address: _____

Tel.: _____ Fax: _____

E-mail: _____

2. DESCRIPTION OF POINT OF CONTACT (*Example: "Country: Aviation Security Department is a telecommunications centre that is open 24 hours a day. Its personnel can immediately connect the caller to an appropriate investigator or expert. The Command Centre itself does not have electronic evidence investigators or experts."*)

3. LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES OF CONTACT (*Example: "Country: Command Centre personnel speak English only."*)

4. PLEASE PROVIDE E-MAIL CONTACT FOR DISTRIBUTION OF UPDATES TO CONTACT POINT LIST (*Example: "COUNTRY: Johndoe@xxx.gov and Marydoe@xxx.gov "*)

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